conditions that brought about the revolt in Brest and suggest a much more fragmented picture complicated by specific local issues.
The importance of Paris as the spark that would bring about revolts around the country is not in question. As Edmond Monange comments: 'Il n'y aurait pas eu de mai 68 brestois s'il n'y avait pas eu de gauchistes à Nanterre, des échauffourées à la Sorbonne, des barricades sur le boul'Mich' (Monange 1998, p. 21) . Nonetheless, Bernard Boudic President of the Association générale des étudiants brestois (AGEB) in 1968, a prominent member of the Brestois branch of the UNEF and a major protagonist in these regional events, fails to recognise his 1968 in the way the events are commonly portrayed, lending weight to the argument that this 'official history' does not tell the whole story. As Boudic commented when asked how he considered the current over-emphasis on Paris: 'C'est historiquement une erreur. C'est une erreur qui rend fausse l'interprétation de ces événements. On ne prend pas tout en compte et donc forcément on a une idée fausse de la chose. C'est étonnant. C'est choquant au point de vue de la raison' (Boudic 2005 ). An examination of the conditions that led to the Brestois revolt together with an analysis of its nature will help in assessing to what extent Boudic's claim is justified.
Local Circumstances
When describing the inability of the state to come to terms with what was happening in the early weeks of the '68 events, accounts often refer to the surprise element (Le Goff 1998, p. 59) . The unexpectedness of the revolt adds to the difficulty commentators have explaining why it took hold. Many analyses set the revolt in the context of the great stability that characterised France in the late 60s.
2 A common narrative is the following. In the late 1960s, France basked in the comfort of economic wealth and stability. Having embraced the consumer society, Gaullist France was very much in the process of making up lost ground in its bid to again be amongst the most powerful nations of the world. During the decade following General de Gaulle's accession to power, France had experienced a period of political stability it had not known for many years. Having benefited from the advantages of continuous economic expansion and become accustomed to material wealth and comfort, the baby-boom generation revolted against the prevailing social conservatism (Lefebvre 1998, p. 91) .
De Gaulle personified resistance to change and appeared to prevent socio-political developments evident elsewhere in the world. Inspirational figures such as Castro, Mao and Guevara provided romantic alternatives to the humdrum and conservative nature of the Gaullist Republic (Dreyfus-Armand et al 2000, p. 27) . The stark contrast between the life experiences of those born during or just after the War and their elders led to a generation clash (Le Goff 1998, p. 33) . Not having experienced the War, occupation and reconstruction, as their parents and grandparents had, young people did not see the need for a strong leader such as de Gaulle. Furthermore, accustomed to relative comfort, they had no difficulty in rebelling against a system their elders had struggled long and hard to put in place. It should be noted that this narrative is, more often than not, set in the backdrop of the capital, with conditions of young Parisians coming to represent those of the entire nation.
A spoilt generation rebelling at a time of great economic expansion and full employment seems ironic now at a time when such comforts have disappeared. As
France struggles with economic and social instability it is very easy to point the finger, as Sarkozy and others have done, at a rebellious generation and its ingratitude during a time that has been portrayed as one that many would long for today.
However, the apparent prosperity that preceded and arguably provoked the May '68
outbursts was not present everywhere.
Brittany's isolation, underdevelopment and cultural differences were long a feature of its particular relationship with Paris. both of which were dependent on the University of Rennes. The student corpus was made up mostly by people from relatively modest backgrounds, many of whom were the first from their family to be given the opportunity to go to university. This was critically important in determining their attitudes towards the system and thus influenced their behaviour during the events. As Vincent Porhel puts it: 'Il faut voir ce que c'était l'étudiant breton. Ce n'était pas des étudiants parisiens, l'étudiant breton, il sort du disciplinaire, une éducation catholique, les parents sont ouvriers, agriculteurs.
Pour eux l'université ce n'est pas la rigolade. Si jamais ils ratent leurs examens ils n'ont pas droit à un second tour. Pour eux la fac c'est pour trouver du boulot et pour trouver du boulot vite. On n'a pas du tout le même profil que l'étudiant parisien. Ils ne sont pas là pour faire la révolution' (Porhel 2005) . While Porhel could be said to be invoking a rather stereotypical view of Parisian students here, his portrait of the Brest student body is telling. This profile together with the relative novelty of the establishment meant that there was little in the way of militant student activity. There were student associations such as, L'Union des Etudiants Communistes (UEC), La
Jeunesse Etudiante Bretonne (JEB) or La Jeunesse Etudiante Catholique (JEC).
However, such groups had very few members and little influence. The one organisation that seemed to provide a common denominator was L'AGEB. This regional branch of l'UNEF, headed by Bernard Boudic, was the most influential of student organisations and would go on to play a pivotal role in the events of May-June 1968.
The CLU de Brest had distinct difficulties but was also experiencing the effects of the general frustration making itself felt in universities around the country. 8 Critically understaffed and lacking in facilities, the Brestois CLU -like many higher education establishments elsewhere in France at the time -was struggling to meet the demands of the baby-boom. However, on top of these more general complications, it was grappling with other difficulties including incomplete courses and the frequent absence of teaching staff -problems that were attributed to the over-dependence on (Porhel 1988, p. 25) . Whilst the national problems were unquestionably important, such regional specificities must be taken into account when trying to understand how May-June 1968 was experienced differently there. As Vincent Porhel argues: 'A Brest comme à Paris, le malaise étudiant existe, mais la poudre et l'étincelle n'étant pas de même nature, l'explosion n'a pas les mêmes effets' (Porhel 1988, p. 9) . As a result of this distinctly different set of circumstances, the events that took place, their mobilising factors and the composition of the movement in Brest were to be very much in contrast to those usually considered today as vital.
Activism
Upon hearing news of what had been happening in Paris at the beginning of May, the then generally apolitical Brestois student population followed the AGEB call for a strike on 6 May in protest against police brutality in the capital. To everyone's surprise, this initiative was strongly supported, with teaching staff particularly active alongside students (Porhel 1988, p. 46) . Attention then turned to the mass demonstration organised for 8 May. As headlines in the local press reveal, the success of the demonstration was not limited to Brest: 'Plus de 100 000 ouvriers, paysans, étudiants ont manifesté pour la survie de leur région' (Ouest France 9 May 1968, p.
6). As explained by Annie Jeffroy, despite the level of frustration, the demonstration was marked in particular by its discipline and lack of violence: 'A 14h, Brest reprend son aspect normal : les embarras de la circulation recommencent, la journée du 8 mai s'est déroulée de bout en bout dans l'ordre' (Jeffroy 1987, p. 57 (Jeffroy 1987, p. 60 ). As at a national level, the one-day strike on 13 May in protest against police brutality soon took the form in
Brest of an all-out general strike (Jeffroy 1987, p. 93) . Over the course of the next three weeks, Brest was gradually brought to a standstill with daily rallies, general assemblies and the politicisation of the movement (Monange 1998, p. 18). The '68 events in Brest also saw the participation of the farming community, a sector of the society that until then had preferred to remain independent and certainly would not have wanted to be aligned with any student movement. However, when the strike began to create major practical difficulties, particularly in terms of food supply, the farming community was on hand to donate some of its produce and to participate in its distribution (Monange 1998, p. 17) .
In Brest neither the Grenelle accords nor de Gaulle's second address reduced the determination of the Bretons to keep their movement alive (Jeffroy 1987, p. 139) . Throughout France, many sectors of society were involved in the '68 events, and in that respect Brest was no different. However, closer examination reveals how local circumstances created a different dynamic in terms of the movement's composition. This stemmed from particular objectives related to the regional context that in turn explains how the forms of action employed were different from those commonly associated with the '68 events. For example, as well as being heavily centred on Paris, the dominant narrative is characterised by several concerns, one of which is the depiction of a lack of student/working-class fraternisation (Johnson 1972 ). Many analyses refer to the turning away of students at the gates of the Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt -the fiefdom of working-class militancy and bastion of the Communist CGT-as indicative of the complete failure of students and workers to unite. 9 The impression given is one of a highly fragmented movement. The divorce between the student and workers' movements is often explained by the very different motivations that caused opposing sections of the population to take part in the revolt.
For example, the student movement is commonly depicted as irresponsible, based on utopian ideals with no serious consideration for an alternative to the system it was happening on a nationwide basis with the implication that regional movements developed very much in response to events in the capital (Martelli 1988, pp. 62-65) .
In contrast with this image, Brestois students were extremely pragmatic and realistic in what they hoped to achieve. When the strike began on 6 May in the CLU, it was very much in line with the nationwide protest concerning Parisian events.
However, as the crisis unfolded, the Brestois student movement distanced itself from what was occurring in the capital. In Porhel's words, 'au début ils vont suivre, après ils vont se décaler et ce qui se fait à l'intérieur de l'université va être beaucoup plus particulier' (Porhel 2005) . A commission paritaire was set up comprising students, teachers and non-teaching staff, with the aim of discussing and putting together suggestions on future reform of the university system. It had specific objectives from the start: 'Les premières discussions s'engagèrent sur des thèmes proprement universitaires: organisation des enseignements, des examens, formation pédagogique The striking CSF workers focused on the issues of control and participation, demanding a greater say in the overall running and management of the factory.
During the occupation, strikers set up workshops and commissions on a wide range of subjects and published their findings and conclusions in Notre Combat. The second issue of this journal would see the raison d'être of these commissions explained and was responsible for this factory becoming the focus of much attention: 'La création des commissions ouvrières n'est qu'une première étape. Elle doit permettre aux travailleurs de vouloir aller plus loin dans la perspective de l'autogestion' (Centre CSF 1968, p. 2) . One of the workers' major concerns was to demonstrate that they were capable of running the factory themselves and at one stage they were close to reopening it under their control (Delale et al 1978, p. 94) . Although this failed to happen, their strike was of particular significance as one of the first examples of 'autogestion'. In the years following the 1968 events, this became a buzzword and formed the bedrock of the CFDT's policy. Ten years later, the Brestois CSF factory was still a reference point for the CFDT as regards 'autogestion' (Syndicalisme 1978, p. 16 the various student-teacher commissions that had been established around the country during the crisis organised a meeting in Clermont-Ferrand during which they compared each set of proposals in order to determine which could best serve the cause of the university reform movement. A team of Brestois representatives was present and among its members was Fanch Broudig who was not only an extremely important member of the Brest student movement, but has also gone on to become a highly respected and famous member of the Breton language movement, most notably known for his regular news programmes in Breton on France 2 (Broudig 2004 ).
Amongst the wide-ranging proposed reforms, it was the one from the CLU de Brest that received most plaudits and was unanimously accepted as the most appropriate. 1968, p. 36) . The lack of coverage or attention paid to the events in Brittany has obscured these facts. While this relative lack of interest is perhaps due to the absence of both violence and utopian politics in the Breton case, the importance of the reformist '68 and of Brest's contribution to it should not be ignored.
Conclusion
While studies of regional movements are not completely absent (Chaffard 1968; Le Madec 1988) and many of the more complete analyses of the events highlight some important regional developments, 13 Considerations of regional 1968 movements are in demand, with conferences and study groups turning their attention to how the crisis was experienced in provincial
France. 14 The evidence from Brest suggests that this will prove a fertile area of enquiry for our understanding of the May movement as a whole. Such developments should thus go some way to addressing the situation lamented by Monange, who continues to regret that 'les gens ont plus tendance à regarder l'écume de mai 68 plutôt que le fond de ce qui se produisait à cette époque-là, les embruns plus que les vagues' (Monange 2004).
Notes

